ABSTRACT A conventional divisible E-cash (DEC) system allows each user to withdraw a coin of value 2 n , then spend it in several times by dividing it into small ones of value 2 l , for some l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n}.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of smartphone and network services, more and more people choose E-payment for their transactions. Many E-payment systems can achieve efficient on-line(or off-line)payment,such as WeChat, Alipay,worldpay,etc.However,only a few systems provide privacy protection of users,their personal information can easily be used by unexpected entities. Electronic Cash (E-cash) [1] , [2] is introduced to be the digital analogue of regular money in which, user's privacy can be guaranteed as long as the user is honest.
An E-cash scheme [3] , [4] involves three entities,including user,bank and merchant. Any user is allowed to withdraw coins from a designated bank and then spend them to merchants. Unfortunately,coins are series of digital bits,they can be easily duplicated and spent again. Therefore, Traceability is an important property of e-cash to detect double spending and identify the defrauders. Meanwhile, no one can trace the consumption information of the honest users follows from the anonymity property.Usually,Bank is trusted by all
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jiafeng Xie.
the users and will be designated as the entity to detect double spending and revoking anonymity in case of fraud, thus,it should be equipped with powerful computer system and database system. As for the user's side, E-cash application software will be installed on a mobile device(e.g. smart phone or Pad) with limited computational power and strong storage space constraints. Thus,efficient withdrawal and spending protocols are two ultimate goals when designing E-cash systems.With the development of smartphone and network services, more and more people choose E-payment for their transactions. Many E-payment systems can achieve efficient on-line(or off-line)payment,such as WeChat, Alipay,worldpay,etc.However,only a few systems provide privacy protection of users,their personal information can easily be used by unexpected entities. Electronic Cash(E-cash) [1] , [2] is introduced to be the digital analogue of regular money in which, user's privacy can be guaranteed as long as the user is honest.
An E-cash scheme [3] , [4] involves three entities,including user,bank and merchant. Any user is allowed to withdraw coins from a designated bank and then spend them to merchants. Unfortunately,coins are series of digital bits,they can be easily duplicated and spent again. Therefore, Traceability is an important property of e-cash to detect double spending and identify the defrauders. Meanwhile, no one can trace the consumption information of the honest users follows from the anonymity property.Usually,Bank is trusted by all the users and will be designated as the entity to detect double spending and revoking anonymity in case of fraud, thus,it should be equipped with powerful computer system and database system. As for the user's side, E-cash application software will be installed on a mobile device(e.g. smart phone or Pad) with limited computational power and strong storage space constraints. Thus,efficient withdrawal and spending protocols are two ultimate goals when designing E-cash systems.
A. RELATED WORK
Compact E-Cash. Camenisch, Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [5] proposed the first compact E-cash system, in which, users can be allowed to withdrawal wallets with 2 n coins at once, but spend them one by one. Each coin is associated with a unique serial number and it's face value is set as 1 cent, this is also the minimum amount provided in compact systems. The bank can detect double spending by checking whether the serial number deposited twice. Actually, there are many transactions involved dozens of dollars or, even more, thus one transaction may need thousands of spending procedures,this will be a burden for a mobile device to execute spending protocol.To improve withdraw efficiency,one solution is using batch spending [6] to pretreat the coins, the computation time and space complexities of pretreatment is linearly increased with the number of coins spent. Another method could be to implement multiple systems using distinct denominations,but this would be more difficult for withdraw and spending execution on the user's side and, for depositing execution on the merchant's side.
Partial Divisible E-Cash. In order to distinguish conventional divisible E-cash systems from our construction proposed later, we revised the definition of divisible E-cash.
Definition 1: Partial Divisible E-cash(PDEC). An E-cash system is called a Partial Divisible E-cash(PDEC) system if it follows, users withdraw a coin(or coins) of value 2 n at once, but can spend a coin(or coins) of value 2 l at once for any l, there n, l ∈ N * , n ≥ l ≥ 0.
Indeed, conventional Divisible E-Cash systems can be classified into Partial Divisible E-cash systems.Many PDEC systems have been proposed,only a few achieve truely anonymous. In systems proposed in literatures [7] , [8] ,coins are linkable if they are generated from the same withdraw.In fair E-cash systems [9] , [10] ,a specific entity is given the ability to revoke anonymity of any transaction, thus, honest users' privacy can't be guaranteed and in addition which part of the wallet is spent is revealed. Canard and Gouget's scheme [11] is the first truly anonymous system.However,no efficient algorithms have been given to generate the DDH groups and the series of primes, and the spending protocol requires quite an expensive computational costs.Using a statistical approach, Au,Willy and Mu proposed a more efficient system [12] which only requires constant exponentiations and pairings, each level of a binary tree is converted into an accumulator value associated with the monetary value of the spent coin. Nonetheless, the assumption that the bank can impose fines on malicious users is not practical.In 2012, Izabachène and Libert [14] constructed the first PDEC in the Standard Model based on a binary tree,where the monetary value of a coin depends on how deep the coin is in the tree.However,their scheme requires a huge pairing computations in the deposit phase and therefore it is inefficient.In order to address this problem, Canard, Pointcheval, Sanders, etc. [3] , [4] proposed a more efficient system in the standard model which achieves constant computations and constant transfer size if the user spends a single coin in spend phase.The system is constructed on a public binary tree of depth n, where each leaf is associated with a serial number and the monetary value of a coin is decided by the number of the leaves behind it.However,their deposit protocol is rather inefficient, the bank must compute 2 n pairings for every coin deposited by merchants,such a downside makes the scheme impractical.Furthermore, no formal security proof of unforgeability has been provided in [3] , [4] . In fact, the unforgeability is an important security requirement for an E-cash scheme [15] . How to construct an efficient scheme secure in the standard model is still an open problem.
In all the above works, a fixed amount 2 n can be withdrawal at once, although the bank can revise n to meet different concrete requirements, it is not consistent with the habits of withdrawing regular paper money,for example, people often withdraws several hundreds or several thousands of paper money. A non-fixed amount of withdrawal will be much more flexible for a E-cash system.
Compared with Compact E-Cash systems, the conventional divisible E-cash schemes allow users to spend a coin of value 2 l at once, there 0 ≤ l ≤ n, instead of spending coins one by one, thus it is much more efficient in many transactions. If a transaction involves just value 2 l , only one spending procedure is required. If it needs to pay coins of value d, there 2 l > d > 2 l−1 , l ∈ N * , n ≥ l > 0, at least two spending procedures should be executed,and at worst, l spending procedures should be run. The computational and communication costs is therefore can be very expensive for a mobile device in some transactions. Actually,the amount of most transactions can not just be 2 l , 0 ≤ l ≤ n, it often involves several coins, time overheads of Spend phase are different from each other duo to different values [16] , therefore, the efficiency of paying for a transaction should be elaborated,instead of spending a single coin.How to construct an efficient scheme with constant computations of spend protocol in standard model is another open problem.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTION
To address the open problems above, we propose the first really efficient divisible E-cash system.Motivated by the works of [3] , [4] ,we proposed a new way to construct coins of E-cash, using linked list, instead of binary tree,which is our main contribution. Each node of the linked list is associated with a unique serial number,which is the best approach to quickly detect double-spending [14] .
There are two major methods to construct divisible coins in previous works [11] - [13] .One is to build a private binary tree for every divisible coin. In withdrawal phase of these schemes, a user designates a number for each node of the tree and obtains a corresponding signature for every number. The coin is defined as the binary tree and along with the signatures. In order to detect double-spending, the user must prove that the binary tree is well-formed in either the spending or the withdrawal protocols.However, the user of scheme [12] uses a cut-and -choose method to provide the validity proof of coins, and the bank can only guarantee that it will not loose money in average.Canard and Gouget [11] provide zero-knowledge proofs in ROM to prove the validity of coins, whereas it is rather inefficient.The second method to construct divisible coins is to build a public binary tree for all the coins. [3] , [4] proposed the solution and given two instantiations.Since the binary tree is public, the bank no longer has to certify each tree. Users is allowed to prove the validity of coins with the Groth-Sahai [18] methodology. Their scheme is the first one to achieve constant time for both Withdraw and Spend protocols.Unfortunetely, their Deposit protocol requires significant computations of pairings.Although the authors declare that the pairings can be computed offline, the merchants will pay too much time to get a response for the validity of the deposited coins.The tree-based construction determine the value of each coin by the node's level.From a given transcript, any one can't compute which node is used.To check the freshness of a given coin of level l, the bank must compute the serial numbers belong to the descendants of every node of level l. Furthermore,which level of the wallet that is being used is known.That is, if k + 1 payees are using the same level k of the tree, everyone can conclude that these k + 1 payees are indeed performed with at least two coins.Actually, there is a balance between efficiency and truly anonymous in all E-cash systems equipped with serial numbers. To achieve truly anonymous, any coin must be independent of the other coins. In other words, no one can compute a coin's serial number, even if all the other coins are known.To check whether a coin has been used, one must computed all possible serial numbers associated with the given coin and check the list of the deposited coins. Thus, truly anonymous E-cash schemes equipped with serial numbers will inevitably lead to an expensive computational costs,which are increasing with the number of deposited coins.
In this paper, we use a totally different approach to construct coins: instead of binary tree structure, we build it based on a public linked list, which will be common to all coins.The key point of this construction is: A coin can be arbitrarily divided into smaller coins, thus, the spending procedures of different transactions can be executed in constant time. This property has not emerged in the previous systems,thus we give a new definition named Arbitrarily Divisible E-cash as follows. No limitation for the amount of withdraw procedure is the first difference between PDEC systems and ADEC systems, the bank can issue coins of any value according to practical applications, it is therefore more flexible than PDEC systems,whose withdraw amount must be 2 n ,for some n ∈ N * . The second deference is that ADEC allows users to arbitrarily divide their coins and then spend to merchants. More concretely, given a coin of value L (L ∈ N * ), one can spend a coin of value l, for any 1 l L(l ∈ N * ), at once. From the definitions, we can see that the Spend protocol of any PDEC scheme can't achieve constant overheads,whereas it is a basic property for ADEC.
The public parameters of our construction contains a unique linked list and bilinear groups (
, which are compatible with the setting of the noninteractive proofs of Groth-Sahai [18] . Our ideal is to generate an element χ s ∈ G T for each node s of the linked list of length L, and there are an element g s ∈ G 1 associated with s. In addition,the public parameters contain an element g s i →s j ∈ G 2 for any two nodes s i and s j (s j is before s i ), such that e(g s i , g s i →s j ) = χ s j . The Withdrawal and Spend protocols are similar to the scheme of [3] , [4] . In a withdrawal phase, a user can get a certificate on a random x ∈ Z p , which will be used to compute the serial number χ x ∈ G T . At the end of the Withdrawal procedures, users will mark the Head of the linked list with a current pointer.The nodes are only allowed to used in sequence. When a set of nodes {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s l−1 } are used, then the Current pointer will point to the next node s l . To spend a coin of value k in the linked list, one first find the current node s l , then compute t s l+k ← g x s l+k and prove that it is well-formed using the GrothSahai methodology.The anonymity property follows from the fact that it is difficult, given g x s and g y s for two nodes s and s , to decide whether they were spending by the same user, no matter s and s are in the same position of the linked list.Given a coin of value l associated with t s i ← g x s i
, the bank only have to compute two pairings:
to detect double-spending,since the nodes are spent in sequence.Thus, our deposit protocol achieves constant time costs for the merchant to get a response.
Bitcoin [29] , [30] is a peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow payments to be executed without financial institution. In fact, There are several essential differences between the Bitcoin and our model. Firstly,in the Bitcoin, the coins are generated by the users themselves, who required to scanning for a value that when hashed, the hash begins with a number of zero bits, while, a bank is an important participant in our model which is the only legal entity permitted to issue coins for users. Secondly, a block is a basic unit of bitcoin, which includes transactions, timestamp, nonce, hash of the previous block, and the hash of this block will VOLUME 7, 2019 be included in the next block. In our model, the node s j in the linked list includes a serial number, which is e(g, g) x·r s j , there x is a secret value of a user. An user can generate a tuple (t s j , v s j ) of node s j , which can be used to compute the serial number of nodes before s j . Thirdly, the freshness of coin is guaranteed by timestamp in bitcoin, the doublespending can be detected by the bank in our model. Fourthly, the Bitcoin is secure based on at least two assumptions, first, the hash function is collision-resistant, secondly, most of the users in the system are honest, that is to say, at least 51% users are honest. Our model is secure based on the following conditions, firstly, the hash function is secure, secondly, the mathematics assumpions used in the model are hold, such as the DL Assumption,q-SDH assumption, the weak-EXDH ssumption and EXDH assumption. Our system can executed securely for every user even if all the other users, the bank and merchants are colluded together.
C. ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,we present preliminary information on the various cryptographic tools and assumptions used in our construction.Security model for arbitrarily divisible E-cash is described in Section III.We present a more detailed presentation of our construction in Section IV. Its security proofs and efficiency analysis are given in Section V and Section VI, respectively. Finally we conclude in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. PAIRING
A pairing is a bilinear mapping from two group elements to a group element. Let e be a bilinear map such that e : G 1 × G 2 → G T and the following holds.
-G 1 , G 2 , and G T are cyclic groups of prime order p.
-e is efficiently computable.
We will work in Type-3 groups from [20] , where there are no efficiently computable isomorphisms between G 1 and G 2 .We say {G 1 , G 2 , G T } are bilinear groups.
B. MATHEMATICAL ASSUMPTIONS
Security of our construction depends on several mathematical assumptions as follows.
-the DL assumption holds in a group G if it is hard to output x, given (g, g x ) ∈ G 2 ; -the q-SDH assumption holds in a group G if it is hard to output a pair (m, g
2 .
-the EXDH assumption [4] holds in bilinear groups
C. DIGITAL SIGNATURE
A digital signature scheme contains algorithms .Keygen, .Sign and .Verify. One can generate a private/public key pair (sk, pk) using algorithm .Keygen. Input a private key sk and a message m, the algorithm .Sign outputs a signature on m. Input a tuple (m, σ, pk), the algorithm .Verify outputs 1 if σ is valid or 0 otherwise.
In this paper, the bank issues digital signatures on some elements in Z p as responses to withdrawal protocols initiated by users. Following [3] , [4] ,our construction uses the AGHO signature [21] which is compatible with the noninteractive proofs of [18] in the standard model or the Blind-LRSW signature [22] which is compatible with the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [17] .
III. ARBITRARILY DIVISIBLE E-CASH SYSTEM
Most previous works building their coins based on a binary tree,each node of the tree is associated with a unique serial number of a coin which allows the bank to efficiently reveal double-spending.The monetary value of the node is decided by its depth,in the other words, by the number of nodes behind it. The merchants would accept the coins in transactions if and only if the users can prove that they are well-formed. In systems [11] - [13] ,each user used his private tree whose nodes must be certificated in withdraw procedure, this approach led to costly generations of public parameters [11] or impractical assumption that the bank can impose fines on malicious users to guarantee economic interests on average [12] . To avoid complex system parameters, a unique public tree and the users' private keys were used to generate serial numbers [3] , [4] ,the system requires constant non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs if only one coin is spent, while the monetary value of coins are limited to 2 l , its spend operation may be costly in a transaction.
The construction of our ADEC is derived from a linked list, for uniformity, whose length is set as L, (L ∈ N * ). Motivated by the work of [3] , [4] , the linked list is unique and broadcasted as part of the public parameters,each node of the list is associated with a serial number,which can be used by the bank to quickly detect double-spending. Zero-knowledge proofs are also used to prove the validity of spent coins. For any transaction, our system only requires constant computations and transfer size in spending phase.Since the system is often installed in a mobile device for users, the spending protocol is a bottle neck, our system is much more practical.
An arbitrarily divisible e-cash is a tuple ( Setup,Bkeygen, Keygen, Withdraw,Spend,Deposit,Identify) of seven polynomial time algorithms/protocols involves three entities: the bank B, a user U and a merchant M. -Setup (1 k , L) . On input a security parameter k and an integer L, this algorithm outputs the public parameters p.p. which includes global value L of arbitrarily divisible coins. Let S 0 be a set of continuous positive integers which consists of L elements. s 1 is the smallest integer in S 0 and s L the biggest.Intuitively, S 0 is used to construct coins of value L, as illustrated in Figure 1 , each node of the list will refer to an element s ∈ S 0 , the link head to the integer s 1 , the link tail to the integer s L . For any two adjacent nodes s i and
Each element of S 0 is associated with an unique serial number which can be used for double-spending detection.The current pointer is pointing to the current node which is used to separate the unspent coins from the used ones. Public parameters. A pairing is a bilinear mapping from two group elements to a group element. Let e be a bilinear map such that e :
is thus a generator of G T . In addition, a trusted entity generates
Following the e-cash scheme [4] , we also have * for the random oracle model, two collision-resistant hash functions H :{0, 1} * → Z p and H : {0, 1} * → Z p ; * for the standard model, a CRS for the Groth-Sahai proofs and a one-time signature scheme ots .
Finally, the public parameters p.p. are set as ). Thus, the merchant can complete the whole depositing procedure in an efficient way. In [3] , [4] , the bank must compute at least 2 n pairings to determine the freshness of each submitted transcript, that is to say, the merchant can get a result after all the 2 n pairings are computed for each deposited transcript, this downside make the system impractical. -Identify((l 1 , Z 1 , 1 2 ) involving the same coin, the algorithm outputs the public key upk of the double-spender. Correctness Requirements. It is required that an honest user obtains coins from an honest bank who will store arbitrarily coins accepted by any honest merchant.
A. SECURITY NOTIONS
As in [3] and [4] ,we describe informally the security requirements of an arbitrarily divisible e-cash system. A secure arbitrarily divisible e-cash system should possess, anonymity,traceability and exculpability, based on the following oracles.
-OAdd() is an oracle to add a new honest user (resp.merchant). Whenever a request is submitted to this oracle by an adversary A, the challenger C runs the algorithm Keygen, stores usk(resp. msk) and returns upk(resp. mpk). In this case, upk(resp. mpk) is said honest. -OCorrupt(upk/mpk) is an oracle accessed by A wishes to corrupt an honest user(resp. merchant) with public key upk(resp. mpk).T he challenger C returns the corresponding secret usk(resp. msk) and the secret values of every coin obtained by the user to A. Then, upk(resp. mpk) is said corrupted. -OWithdraw U (upk) is an oracle used by A playing the role of the bank of the Withdraw protocol, against the user whose public key is upk. -OWithdraw B (upk) is an oracle used by A playing the role of a user of the Withdraw protocol, against the bank. -OSpend(upk, v) is an oracle used by A playing the role of the merchant of the Spend protocol, against a user whose public key is upk. It is worthy to note that the O(AddCorrupt(upk/mpk) oracle does not returns more information than using the OCorrupt(upk/mpk) on the same public key, thus there is no need for a O(AddCorrupt(upk/mpk) oracle.
The value spent by user with public key upk is denoted by c upk . Then the total amount available by the user is m upk · L, if he/she withdrew m upk coins.
Following [3] , [4] ,we describe the security model below, which consist of anonymity, traceability and exculpability.
Anonymity. It is required no collusion of merchants, the bank and malicious users can ever learn the identity of an honest user from the spent coins. Refer to [3] , [4] , we define the anonymity games Exp
(1 k , L) as described on Fig. 2 .To avoid A wins the game, it is required that the total amount spent by each user is limited to less than(or equal to) m upk · L.
FIGURE 2. Anonymity Game.

Adv anon
]. An arbitrarily divisible e-cash system is anonymous if, for any probabilistic polynomial adversary A, the advantage Adv anon A (1 k , L) is negligible. Our construction does not satisfy the strong unlinkability as described in [3] and [4] since it reveals which part of the coin that is being used. However, if each user withdraws more than one coin, then he/she can use two nodes of the same position in two different transactions. That is, if the payee of transaction one and the payee of transaction two are using the same part of a coin, anyone can not determine that whether these two transactions are performed with the same user. Furthermore, the linked list, instead of the tree structure is used to constructed a coin, this method reduced many computations for Deposit. It turns out that this method greatly increase the efficiency of our system.
Traceability. It is required that no coalition of users can double-spend a coin without revealing their identities. We define the traceability game Exp tra A (1 k , L) as described in Figure 3 . Assume there are m coins withdrawn during the entire game, and {(l 1 , Z 1 , 1 ), · · · , (l u , Z u , u )} is the set of all the spent transcripts. The advantage Adv tra
. An arbitrarily divisible e-cash system satisfy traceability if, for any probabilistic polynomial adversary A, this advantage is negligible.
Exculpability. It is required that an honest user can't be proven to have double-spent a coin,even the bank,merchants and all other users collude.We define the exculpability game Exp excu A (1 k , L) as described in Figure 4 . The advantage
]. An arbitrarily divisible e-cash system is exculpable if, for any probabilistic polynomial adversary A, this advantage is negligible.
Unforgeability. It is required no collusion of merchants, the bank and malicious users can forge a unspent coin of any honest user based on the spent coins. We define the unforgeability game Exp unforge A (1 k , L) as described in Figure 5 . The advantage Adv
An arbitrarily divisible e-cash system is unforgeability if, for any probabilistic polynomial adversary A, this advantage is negligible. 
IV. OUR ARBITRARILY DIVISIBLE E-CASH SYSTEM
-Bkeygen():Upon receiving the public parameters p.p., the bank will select two different signature schemes:
• 0 = (Keygen, Sign, Verify), whose message space is G 2 1 ,to sign some elements of p.p.. It is secure against selective chosen message attacks. The structure preserving scheme [21] could satisfy the requirements above.
• 1 = (Keygen, Sign, Verify), whose message space depends on the security model. * ROM: Inputs (u x 1 , u y 2 ) for some (x, y) ∈ Z 2 p , the scheme 1 is denoted as 1 SignCommit if it could output a valid signature on (x, y). The scheme from [23] or [24] can be implemented to meet the requirements. * Standard Model: The message space is G 2 1 , we can choose the scheme from [21] again. The bank will get (sk 1 , pk 1 ) ← 1 .Keygen(1 k ) and (sk g s i , h s i ) ). Finally, bsk is set as sk 1 and bpk is set as ({pk
Each user (resp.merchant) selects a random usk ∈ Z p (resp. msk) as his/her secret key, and computes upk ← g usk (resp.mpk ← g msk ) as his/her public key.
-Withdraw():To withdraw a coin from the bank, the user Alice first randomly chooses x ∈ Z p and computes u usk 1 and u x 2 . She sends upk, u usk 1 , u x 2 to the bank,along with the proof of knowledge of x and usk, using for example the Schnorr's interactive protocol [19] . If u x 2 is fresh and the proof is valid, the bank
• ROM: runs the 1 . SignCommit on (u usk 1 , u x 2 ) and sends the resulting signature σ to Alice who sets C ← (x, σ ).
• Standard Model: computes σ ← 1 . Sign(sk 1 , (u usk 1 , u x 2 )) and sends it to Alice who sets C ← (x, σ ). Alice lets the current pointer point to the node s 0 . -Spend(): to spend coins of value l, Alice first find the node s i−l+1 which is pointed by the current pointer, then the nodes s i−l+1 , s i−l+2 , · · · , s i will be spent to the Merchant Bob. Alice then computes r ←
), where info ← (l, date, mpk, trans). info is the string collection containing the amount value l of coins to pay, transaction time date, merchant Bob's public key mpk, other negotiation information trans. She must prove that the tuple (t s i , v s i ) are well-formed,i.e. that she used coins certified by the bank, hence a proof of knowledge of σ , and that she used a valid tuple (g s i , h s i ), which can be provided by τ s i in bpk. Following the scheme of [3] , [4] , the concrete protocols for ROM and standard model are described in details as follows.
• ROM:Alice provides a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of usk, x, g s i , h s i , τ s i ,and such that: [22] ,Alice parses σ as (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ) and randomizes it as σ = (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ) ← (z t 1 , z t 2 , z t 3 , z t 4 ) by a random element t ∈ Z p .She then picks k ∈ Z p randomly and computes t s i , v s i , σ , c, z) to the merchant Bob. Essentially,applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [17] , Alice turns such a proof into a signature of knowledge ← (σ , c, z).
• 
= w along with a NIWI proof π that the committed values satisfy: The proof is identical to [4] ,the Groth-Sahai methodology is used based on the signature scheme in [21] . Finally, Alice can get a one time signature η ← g 1 sk ots +H (ts i ||vs i ||π||π ||r) [24] , then she sends {l, η, t s i , v s i , pk ots , π, π } to Bob who will set ← (π, π , pk ots , η). In both cases, Bob will accept the coins and store Z ← (t s i , v s i ) and if and only if both the signatures and the proofs are valid. Alice will let the current pointer point to node s i+1 . 
to the database and store the transcript (l, Z , ). Else, there exists another entry (l , Z , ) associated with an element z such that z j = z . The bank returns
To check the freshness of each coin deposited by Bob, computing the following pairing is enough:z i−l+1 = e(t s i , g s i →s i−l+1 ). If z i−l+1 doesn't exist in DB, then the bank will get that no z j (j ∈ {i − l + 1, i − l + 2, · · · , i}) has been used, and the transcript (l, Z , ) is fresh. As soon as z i−l+1 were computed, the merchant Bob got a response from the Deposit protocol. -Identify():Input the entry [(l 1 , Z 1 , 1 ), (l 2 , Z 2 , 2 )],the entity Trent will return the identity of a doublespender. He first checks the validity of (l, Z , ) and (l , Z , ) and returns ⊥ if one of them is invalid. Else, He will continue to compute as follows.Assume (l, Z , ) and (l , Z , ) are associated with s i 1 and s i 2 , respectively. Trent computes, for k ∈ {1, 2} and for every node s j ∈ {s 
V. EFFICIENCY
We compare the efficiency of our construction with the divisible E-cash schemes of [3] , [4] and the one of [31] , which are the only two systems achieved constant time cost for both the Withdraw and the Spend protocols in standard model.
The efficiency is analyzed in two cases:spending a single coin and spending coins of a same value l in a transaction, they are illustrated in Table 1 and Fig.6 , respectively.In Table 1 , we assume that the users withdraw coins of value 2 n in [4] , of value N in [31] and of value L in our system, there
The value L of Withdrawal protocol of our scheme can be any positive integer. We set the constraint L = 2 n to simplify the efficiency comparison. In practical implementations, we advice L be times of one hundred to follow withdrawal habits, such as 500,1000,5000,and so on.
According to ISO/IEC 15946-5 standard [25] ,the BarretoNaehrig curves [26] can be used to realize the pairing operations in the scheme of [4] and our scheme. For a 128-bits security level, we can set p = 256, |G 1 | = 256 and |G 2 | = 512 whereas q must be greater than 3072 [27] .
Since the resource-constrained mobile device on the user's side is the performance bottleneck, the space and computation costs are given from the user's point of view. E G 1 refers to an exponentiation in G 1 , Pair to a pairing computation, Sign to the cost of the signature issuing procedure, and pk to the average size of public keys of the related signature schemes.
The symbols of G 1 , G 2 and G T indicate the average sizes of elements in group G 1 , G 2 and G T , respectively. NIZK {exp} denotes the cost of a NIZK proof of a multi-exponentiation equation, NIZK {Pair} the one of a pairing product equation and NIZK {Sign} the one of a valid signature.
Public Parameters. From Table 1 , we can see that as the number n increases,compared with the scheme from [4] and the one from [31] , more storage space is required to store the public parameters in our scheme.Encouragingly, for a moderate L = 1024(n = 10), the storage space required by these parameters in our scheme is less than 17MBytes which is completely acceptable for a smartphone. The same space is needed to store parameters on the Merchant's side, while the Bank requires additional 17MBytes to store { g s i →s j }, which is still practical.
Withdrawal and Spending. The cost of withdrawal computations of our scheme is same as the other two schemes. Since spending is the most frequently operation for users, a practical E-cash scheme requires very efficient spending protocol for the limited resources of smartphones and strict time constrains of electronic transactions. Although users can spend a coin with the same time and space costs in the two schemes, they often involve spending more than one coin in a transaction due to the various monetary values in Canard's scheme, in other words, they involve more than one time of spending operation. Fig.6 shows the comparisons of times of spending for user side using a moderate n = 10 and l ∈ {122, 287, 512, 683, 736, 1023} [16] . Only one time spending operation is required in our scheme, which is equal to the scheme from [31] , whereas how many times of spending of scheme [4] the user should execute is depending on different values of transactions. From the figure 6, we can see that when l = 1023, users of Canard's scheme should run 10 times of spending algorithms, that means the costs of computations and transfer size of Spend phase have risen by 10 times, compared with our scheme. For a general n, the efficiency ratio of spend protocols between the two scheme can reach n = log 2 2 n in extreme cases. The scheme described in this paper is the first one achieves real constant costs of space and computations in both withdrawal and spending protocols in a transaction.
The advantage of our scheme will be illustrated in terms of probability by example of Taobao.com, one of the largest E-commerce platform. To illustrate the spend performance, we assume that Alice will buy a lady bag from Taobao.com. Inputs lady bag in the search bar, and the price is set between 100 RMB and 300 RMB, the bags are sorted by sales volume from high to low. The top 50 bags are took into account. Assume a user need to execute t times Spend protocol to buy a bag. Pr[] is used to mark the probability. It is easy to get that using the schemes in [4] =1 is always hold in our schemes, which is equal to the scheme of from [31] . Fig.7 shows the comparison of the probability for different values of t. Users only need to run one time Spend protocol in our schemes and [31] . Using the schemes of [3, 4] , a user need to run Spend protocol at least 2 times, and at most 7 times, most likely he need to run Spend protocol 4 times, with probability 0.32. Deposit. Especially, our Deposit protocol only involves l pairings, while using the scheme of [3] , [4] the bank requires up to 2 n pairings even if the merchant submitted a coin of value l = 1. The computational cost of Deposit protocol of our scheme is only half of the scheme from [31] . From the aspect of economy, our scheme has a higher cost performance.
Assume the merchants of the top 50 best seller of lady bags on the Taobao.com deposit the received coins once a week. The amount deposited by these merchants is denoted as k, which is equal to weekly sales multiplied by unit price. One can get that Pr[k ≥ 1, 000, 000] = 1/50, Pr[200, 000 ≥ k ≥ 100, 000] = 11/50 and Pr[100, 000 ≥ k ≥ 10, 000] = 38/50. Thus, a practical E-cash scheme must provide acceptable response time for a merchant to deposit 1,000,000 coins. Our schemes allow a merchant deposit 100,000 coins within 20 minutes, deposit 200,000 coins within 40 minutes, and deposit 1,000,000 coins within 3 hours, it is completely acceptable, while the waiting time for the merchant of [31] will double.
If the pairings are executed on a PC platform with a 3.16 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo E8500, 64-bit Windows 7 system, then the average time overheads of one pairing is 4.64ms [28] . For L = 2 10 = 1024, merchant using the scheme [3] , [4] must require at least 2 10 * 4.64ms = 4751.36ms = 4.75136s to deposit each coin,while he/she only requires 2 * 4.64ms = 9.28ms in our scheme. According to e-commerce platforms, such as www.jd.com,www.taobao.com,etc, we can see that transactions done by a single merchant can be more than 1,000,000, the merchant can get at least 1,000,000 coins in the best case and then to deposit them. In the system [3] , [4] , a merchant requires more than 13 hours to deposit 10,000 coins, and more than 1300 hours to deposit 1,000,000 coins, it is absolutely unpractical.By employing our scheme, the bank requires computing l pairings for depositing a coin of value l, but only 2 pairings need to executed at once to determine the freshness and return the result to merchant, the other l − 2 pairings can be computed offline. We shows the average time overheads comparison of Deposit phase of our scheme and [31] for merchant side depositing k coins in Figure 8 , there k ∈ {100, 1000, 10000, 100000, 1000000}. The figure omit the Deposit protocol of [4] since it is impractical. From the figure, we can see that a merchant can deposit 100,000 coins within 20 minutes and deposit 1,000,000 coins within 3 hours, it is completely acceptable,it is doubled in [31] . Our system can be applied to secure the E-commerce of merchant with high volumes of transactions.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Refer to the proofs in [3] and [4] , our security proofs are given as follows.
A. PROOF OF ANONYMITY
Let A be an adversary against the anonymity.We construct a reduction R using A s capability to solve the EXDH problem. Let (g, h, g x , h x , g a , h a , g y·a , h y·a , g z 1 , h z 2 ) ∈ G 10 1 and ( g, g a , g y ) ∈ G 2 2 be an EXDH challenge, R randomly picks s * ∈ S 0 and generates the public parameters as follows. ((g z 1 ) r s , (upk * ) r ·(h z 2 ) r s ), iff z 1 = x·y·a = z 2 . R also simulates the proof and answers the oracle queries as previously. In this case, the simulation is perfect.
B. PROOF OF TRACEABILITY
Let A be an adversary against the traceability.We construct a reduction R using ability of A against the unforgeability of signature scheme 0 or 1 . R generates the public parameter p.p. using the Setup algorithm and selects an integer
0 . Finally, R submits (g s i * , h s i * ) to the 0 .Sign oracle to get the signature τ s i * and the public key pk i * 0 . R also receives the public key pk 1 from the challenger of the game of the signature scheme 1 and sets its public key as ({pk
. The reduction will perform as usual if receives OAdd, OCorrupt and OSpend queries and uses its 1 .Sign oracle to answer OWithdraw B queries.
Assume A accesses q w withdrawn queries, and out- , but x / ∈ {x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x q w }.It means that, we generate a valid forgery σ on (usk, x) in the random oracle model or on (u usk 1 , u x 2 ) in the standard model and so breaks the security of 1 .
C. PROOF OF EXCULPABILITY
The proof of exculpability in the random oracle model and the standard model are similar to the proofs in [3] and [4] , we omit them for simplicity.
Theorem 1: In the random oracle model, if H and H are two collision-resistant hash functions, our arbitrarily divisible e-cash system is anonymous under the EXDH assumption, traceable if 0 is secure against selective chosen-message attacks and 1 is an EUF-CMA secure signature scheme, and achieves the exculpability under the discrete logarithm assumption.
Theorem 2:
In the standard model, if H is a collisionresistant hash function, our arbitrarily divisible e-cash system is anonymous under the EXDH assumption, traceable if 0 is secure against selective chosen-message attacks and 1 is an EUF-CMA secure signature scheme, and achieves the exculpability under the q−SDH assumption if ots is a strong one-time signature scheme.
D. PROOF OF UNFORGEABILITY [3, 4] and [31] do not provide proof of unforgeability, which is an important security requirement for E-cash schemes. The proof of unforgeability in the random oracle model and the standard model are similar to the proofs in our model, thus, we provide the proof in standard model and omit the one in random oracle model for simplicity.
Let A be an adversary against the unforgeability. We construct a reduction R using A's capability to solve the EXDH problem.
Let (g, h, g x , h x , g a , h a , g y·a , h y·a , g z 1 , h z 2 ) ∈ G 10 1 and ( g, g a , g y ) ∈ G 2 2 be an EXDH challenge, R randomly picks s * ∈ S 0 and generates the public parameters as follows. ((g z 1 ) r s , (upk * ) r · · · (h z 2 ) r s ), iff z 1 = x · y · a = z 2 . R also simulates the proof and answers the oracle queries. In this case, the simulation is perfect.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, based on a linked-list,we have proposed a practical construction of arbitrarily divisible E-cash. Following the construction, we proposed two e-cash systems,one is secure in the random oracle model and the other one is secure in the standard model. The schemes allow users to withdraw a coin of value L and spend it by dividing it into coins with arbitrarily integer values. Thus, our spend protocols are efficient and can be performed in constant times for any transaction with value no more than L. What is more, our construction can be applied to secure the E-commerce of merchant with high volumes of transactions, a merchant can get a result for depositing a coin in constant time and can complete the deposit procedure in a reasonable time, even if he/she deposits massive coins. Our schemes are quite practical for users/merchants using resource-constrained mobile devices.
